








The University of Adelaide 
School of Economics 
 
 

























Professor of Economics, 





ABSTRACT: After becoming independent in 1991, the five Central Asian countries 
pursued  differing  transition  paths  from  the  defunct  central  planning.    This  paper 
analyses the connection between economic policies and performance during the 1990s 
and  2000s.    Performance  over  the  two  decades  has  been  determined  by  resource 
endowments rather than by policy.  International relations, which were predicted to 
centre on a new Great Game among external powers, have been more  muted than 
anticipated,  centring  on  geopolitics  and  pipelines,  and  with  a  consequence  of 
hampering  desirable  economic  cooperation  within  Central  Asia.    Prospects  for 
significant change in the near future are limited because by the end of the 1990s the 
window of opportunity for policy initiatives had shut and entrenched political regimes 







Paper  to  be  presented  at  the  WIDER  Conference  on  Reflections  on  Transition, 
Helsinki 18-19 September.  The first two sections draw heavily on Pomfret (1995) 
and Pomfret (2006) respectively. 
 
     1 
 
CENTRAL ASIA AFTER TWO DECADES OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
A striking feature of the five Central Asian countries is that they followed divergent 
economic  strategies  after  becoming  independent  in  1991.    Despite  similarities  in 
culture, history and economic structure, their transitions from Soviet central planning 
ranged  from  the  most  rapidly  liberalizing  (the  Kyrgyz  Republic)  to  the  least-
reforming (Turkmenistan) of all former Soviet republics.  By the turn of the century, 
when  the  transition  from  central  planning  was  essentially  completed,  the  Central 
Asian countries had created vastly different economic systems.  This paper analyses 
the  interaction  of  economic  strategy,  institutional  change,  political  evolution  and 
external influences, and their consequences for economic performance. 
The end of the second decade since the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a 
good  time  for  reflection  because  many  developments  have  taken  time  to  work 
themselves out.  Gradual reform in Uzbekistan was associated with the best GDP 
performance of  any Soviet successor states  during the 1990s,  and a lively debate 
sought  to  explain this  phenomenon, but  the outcome in  Uzbekistan has been less 
positive in the second decade.  The other large economy in the region, Kazakhstan, 
appeared  to  underperform  in  the  1990s,  which  was  ascribed  to  institutional 
shortcomings such as pervasive corruption, but in the second decade Kazakhstan has 
been one of the best-performing economies in the world.  The economic performance 
of the three smaller economies has been less positive.  Tajikistan is now one of the 
poorest countries in Asia with characteristics of a failed state.  The Kyrgyz Republic 
appears to be descending a similar path, despite being praised by many economists 
during  the  1990s  for  introducing  market-friendly  reforms.    Turkmenistan,  despite 
gross  mismanagement  under  its  first  President,  has  more  options  because  of  its 
abundant energy resources, but the nature of the regime remains opaque. 
Apart  from  the  differences,  some  commonalities  remain,  in  particular  the 
establishment of super-presidential political systems under autocratic rulers, obstacles 
to trade posed by geography (landlockedness), and unwillingness to engage in any 
serious regional cooperation.  Corruption is also rampant, but comparative measures 
of corruption do not show common patterns of change.  The paper aims to balance the 
impact  of  unchanging  (or  hard  to  change)  geographical  and  cultural  constraints 
against the impact of differing (and changeable) national policies to explain these 
similarities  and  divergences  of  outcome  over  the  first  two  decades,  and  to  draw 
tentative conclusions about future prospects and general lessons about the relationship 
between economic systems and performance. 
 
1. Dissolution of the USSR and the Transition from Central Planning 
 
The five Central Asian countries had no history as nation states before 1992, and 
during the Soviet era economic policy and development strategies were determined in 
Moscow.  None had anticipated the dissolution of the Soviet Union before its final 
months, and all were unprepared for the severing of Soviet ties.  The unexpected 
challenges of nation-building were superimposed on the transition from a centrally 
planned  economy,  which  had  begun  in  the  late  1980s  but  had  little  influence  on 
Central Asia before the Soviet economic system began to unravel in 1991  
All  five  countries  suffered  serious  disruption  from  the  dissolution  of  the 
USSR.  Demand and supply networks based on under-valued transport inputs quickly 
collapsed in the early 1990s.  The shift to world prices notionally benefited the energy   2 
exporters, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (Tarr, 1994), but in the 1990s they were 
unable to realize these gains due to their dependence on Russian pipelines.  Falling 
output and rising prices became much worse after the formal dissolution of the USSR 
removed residual central control over the Soviet economic space (Tables 1 and 2).  
Attempts to maintain economic links by retaining the ruble as a common currency in 
1992-3 exacerbated the problem of hyperinflation and were abandoned by the end of 
1993.
1 
In the decade after independence, the political leaders cemented their personal 
power by creating super-presidential regimes, in which the balance of power between 
executive  and  legislature  was  overwhelmingly  weighted  towards  the  former. 
Tajikistan was the only one of the five countries not to evolve peacefully from Soviet 
republic to independent state under unchanged leadership.  The bloody civil war of 
1992-3, which  reignited in  1996-7, dominated  political  developments  and delayed 
implementation of a serious and consistent economic strategy, but by the end of the 
decade President Rakhmonov had constructed a political system similar to that of his 
neighbours. 
The five countries' economies gradually became more differentiated as their 
governments introduced national strategies for transition to a market-based economy. 
By  the  early  twenty-first  century  all  five  countries  had  essentially  completed  the 
process of nation-building and the transition from central planning.  However, the 
typology  of  market-based  economies  varied  substantially  from  the  comprehensive 
price and trade liberalization and extensive privatization introduced in the Kyrgyz 
Republic between 1993 and 1998 to the non-reform in Turkmenistan. 
The  Kyrgyz  Republic  embraced  advice  from  western  institutions  and 
advocates of rapid change and, within limits, its president fostered the emergence of 
the most liberal regime in the region.  Prices and foreign trade were fully liberalized 
and  small-scale  privatization  was  completed.    In  July  1998,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic 
became the first Soviet successor state to accede to the World Trade Organization.  
The more difficult areas  of transition  such as  enterprise  reform and creation of a 
market-driven  financial  sector  were  less  complete,  and  controversial  infrastructure 
areas such as transport and water remained unreformed (Table 3). 
At  independence,  Kazakhstan  appeared  to  be  the  best  placed  among  the 
Central Asian countries.  Per capita incomes were substantially higher than those of 
the  four  southern  countries,  and  this  was  reflected  in  higher  education  and  other 
human capital  indicators.    Moreover, the  country's  substantial  energy and mineral 
resources  held  great  potential;  the  oil  reserves  were  about  to  be  tapped  by  the 
Chevron-Tengiz  project  under  the  largest  foreign  investment  agreement  in  Soviet 
history.  In 1992 Kazakhstan followed Russia’s sweeping price reform with fewer 
exceptions  than  other  Central  Asian  countries,  but  as  the  1990s  progressed 
Kazakhstan  also  resembled  Russia  in  the  way  that  privatization  created  powerful 
private interests that distorted the reform process (Kalyuzhnova, 1998; Olcott, 2002).  
By the end of the 1990s Kazakhstan had similar transition indicators to the Kyrgyz 
Republic, with less complete trade liberalization but a better functioning financial 
sector  and  more  reformed  infrastructure.    These  two  countries  were  the  most 
successful in stabilizing the macroeconomy, bringing inflation below fifty percent in 
1995 and 1996 respectively (Table 2). 
                                                           
1  The  situation  before  independence  and  the  immediate  post-independence  period  (1992-3)  are 
analyzed in Pomfret (1995).  Islamov (2001) and Gleason (2003) provide alternative accounts of the 
region’s economic development during the 1990s.   3 
In  Tajikistan  the  civil  war  destroyed  the  planned  economy  and  effectively 
privatized  economic  activity  without  the  institutions,  such  as  security  of  contract, 
crucial to efficient operation of a market economy.  Thus the country scored highly on 
price liberalization and privatization, but poorly on enterprise reform or competition 
policy, and abysmally on financial sector reform or infrastructure (Table 3).  After the 
1997  peace  agreement  Tajikistan  was  considered  to  be  a  delayed  reformer  with 
liberalization of trade and financial sector policies, but institutions remain weak. 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are usually lumped together with Belarus as the 
least-reforming of the Soviet successor states, but there are significant differences 
between them.  Although cautious, Uzbekistan was not a non-reformer.  Small-scale 
privatization  and  housing  reform  were  undertaken  quickly.    Macroeconomic 
stabilization was not an initial priority but, after the collapse of the ruble zone at the 
end of 1993, Uzbekistan moved purposefully to reduce inflation.  Macroeconomic 
policy in the two and a half years after January 1994 followed standard IMF advice, 
and relations with the international financial institutions improved over this period.  In 
October  1996,  however,  despite  having  made  commitments  to  the  IMF  to  adopt 
current account convertibility, Uzbekistan responded to falling world cotton prices 
(Figure  1)  by  introducing  forex  controls.    The  controls  were  attractive  because, 
together with the state order system for cotton and wheat, they underpinned a non-
transparent but large taxation of the farm sector.  Expropriation of agricultural rents 
allowed Uzbekistan to maintain public expenditures without inflationary financing, 
and was instrumental in retaining a credible social safety net and the highest ratio of 
education spending to GDP in the CIS.  Nevertheless, these benefits came at a high 
cost, as the controls hindered desirable resource reallocation to actual and potential 
export  sectors  and  the  systemic  nature  of  the  rent-extraction  system  underpinned 
glacially  slow  progress  on  economic  reforms  after  1996.    Uzbekistan’s  financial 
sector  remained  dominated  by  a  state-owned  bank  and  financial  repression  was 
severe.  In rail transport and in some utilities, the government gradually allowed some 
market forces to operate.  Overall, Uzbekistan became a market-oriented economy, 
but with substantial government direction (Pomfret, 2000).  A key distinction between 
Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic or Tajikistan is  that Uzbekistan’s legislative 
record is less reformist but its implementation is more effective.   
Turkmenistan  established  the  most  personalized  and  autocratic  regime  in 
Central Asia, pursuing a policy based on neutrality and economic independence, with 
minimal  economic reform  (Ochs,  1997;  Lubin,  1999;  Pomfret,  2001).  The central 
planning  mechanisms,  which  broke  down  in  the  early  1990s,  were  replaced  by  a 
poorly functioning market economy with heavy state influence.  President Niyazov 
(or Turkmenbashi the Great as he later preferred to be called) retained control over 
resource allocation decisions, which was relatively easy given the simple structure of 
the economy with its high dependence on energy and cotton exports, but was very 
inefficient.
2  Soon after independence he adopted a populist strategy of providing free 
water, electricity, gas, heating, salt and other necessities up to certain limits intended 
to  include  most  household  consumption,  but  much  of  the  state  revenue  went  on 
prestige  projects  to  support  a  bizarre  personality  cult  and  maintaining  internal 
security.  An import-substituting industrialization strategy was designed to increase 
value-added in the energy and cotton sectors, but the textile mills probably crated 
negative value-added (Pomfret, 2001).  In sum, the economy was minimally reformed 
                                                           
2 Cotton was the main source of rents in the 1990s, but heavy-handed intervention led to falling yields.  
After  1998,  as  energy  prices  began  to  rise,  natural  gas  exports  dominated  and  provided  sufficient 
revenues to fund the president's grandiose schemes (Garcia, 2006; Global Witness, 2006).   4 
in the transition from centrally planning, and  government intervention was cruder and 
less developmental than in Uzbekistan.   
   
2. Economic Performance during the First Decade after Independence 
 
The people of Central Asia experienced a huge economic shock in the early 1990s, 
although measuring the exact size of the economic decline both across countries and 
over time is difficult.  The conceptual measurement issues related to the systemic shift 
from central planning affect our assessment of the entire decade, because measures of, 
say, GDP which relate a year to a stable base year such as 1989 (as in Table 1), are 
more  useful  than  the  volatile  annual  growth  rates.  Moreover,  gross  national 
expenditure (GNE) probably fell by more than output in the early 1990s, so that the 
real GDP estimates may fail to capture the decline in living standards when resource 
flows from the rest of the USSR were cut off.
3  Later in the 1990s there were country-
specific gaps between GNE and GDP; the Kyrgyz Republic benefited from substantial 
capital inflows from multilateral and bilateral official sources, but the other Central 
Asian countries received little net capital inflow, apart from military assistance to 
Tajikistan and some direct foreign investment in Kazakhstan.
4 
  On  top  of  these  general  data  issues  are  country-specific  measurement 
problems.  Tajikistan was devastated by a civil war, which lasted for much of the 
1990s,  and  even  after  the  1997  peace  agreement  the  central  government  did  not 
control  all  of  the  national  territory.    In  Turkmenistan,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  in 
Uzbekistan, old attitudes about information being power, and associated practices of 
data manipulation or secrecy, persist.  The Turkmenistan data have often been queried 
by the multilateral agencies and are the least reliable in the CIS.
5 
  Despite this catalogue of problems, the data in Table 2  represent the most 
plausible output estimates and the general patterns correspond with other evidence, 
including casual observation.
6  The economic decline in Tajikistan was traumatic; by 
2000, with a national income per capita of $180, Tajikistan was poorer than most of 
                                                           
3 The inter-republic flows in the USSR are difficult to measure because the Soviet economy was treated 
as a single unit and large flows took place within all-Union enterprises.  Outsiders estimated the net 
flow to the Kyrgyz republic in  the late 1980s at around a seventh of the republic’s gross product 
(Pomfret, 1995, 72; Griffin, 1996, 19), but Central Asian economists have argued that the net inflow 
was  much  smaller  or  even  that  Central  Asia  subsidized  the  rest  of  the  USSR  through  Moscow-
manipulated transfer pricing (Islamov, 2001). 
4 Remittances became increasingly important for Tajikistan, but in the 1990s much of the inflow was in 
cash and not captured in official statistics. 
5 The figures in Tables1 and 2 come from national sources and, while international organizations adjust 
data for definitional consistency, they have no way of correcting undisclosed collection or reporting 
biases.  One discouraging sign about some of the Central Asian data is the large revisions made to the 
growth rates within a few years of their initial publication, e.g. the EBRD Transition Report Update of 
May 2005 gave Turkmenistan's 2002 growth rate as 8% but by the 2009 Update reported in Table 1 
this had been revised to 16%. 
6 Rapid surveys were used to assess immediate needs in the early 1990s (e.g. Howell (1996) on the 
southern districts of the Kyrgyz Republic) and qualitative methods have been used to conceptualize 
interactions between social, economic and psychological elements of changes in living standards (e.g. 
the chapters by Kuehnast on the Kyrgyz Republic and by Gomart on Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 
Dudwick et al., 2003).  The small and possibly unrepresentative samples make generalization of the 
results difficult, but  the patterns of traumatic economic  decline during the  first half  of the 1990s, 
especially  outside  the  capital  cities,  are  incontrovertible.  The  household  survey  data  (analyzed  in 
Anderson and Pomfret, 2003) present a picture of extensive poverty in the mid-1990s.     5 
sub-Saharan Africa or the poorest countries of Asia.
7  Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz 
Republic both suffered substantial setbacks during the first half of the 1990s; both 
economies began growing after 1995, but they were negatively impacted by the 1998 
Russian crisis.  Uzbekistan's economy suffered a smaller transitional recession than 
any other former Soviet republic, and contrary to some predictions it experienced 
positive economic growth after the mid-1990s.
8  Turkmenistan’s performance is the 
most  controversial,  and  independent  checks  on  official  data  are  scarce;  despite 
positive GDP figures the country suffered palpable economic decline and increased 
poverty, but energy revenues and political stability limited the extent of decline. 
The  five  countries’  economic  performance  in  the  1990s  has  mostly  been 
analyzed within the context of over two dozen countries in eastern Europe and the 
former USSR abandoning central planning within a few years of one another.  The 
eastern European countries as a group outperformed the CIS countries, but whether 
that reflected superior policies or better initial conditions is difficult to identify.
9  That 
is not to say that we learned nothing from the econometric studies.  Conflict was bad 
for growth; countries with civil or interstate wars tended to be slow reformers and had 
a poor growth record.  High inflation is bad for growth, although moderate inflation is 
less clearly harmful.
10  Although there are debates about the threshold, all transition 
economies  quickly  recognized  the  costs  of  hyperinflation  and,  whether  they  were 
committed  to  structural  reform  or  not,  they  all  sooner  rather  than  later  attacked 
hyperinflation with standard monetary policy weapons. 
  A complement to the econometric work is national case studies. The Central 
Asian countries offer a natural experiment, with their fairly similar initial conditions 
and  radically  different  approaches  to  creating  market-based  economies.    On  more 
detailed investigation, the situation is less clear than this simplified characterization 
suggests.    Initial  conditions  did  vary,  ranking  by  degree  of  reform  is  not  as 
straightforward  as  simple  transition  indicators  suggest,  and  policymaking  has  not 




Despite  its  advantages,  Kazakhstan  faced  two  serious  obstacles.  It  was  the  only 
Central Asian country where the titular nationality was not in the majority.  In the 
1989 census the population was approximately two-fifths Kazakh, two-fifths Russian 
and one-fifth other ethnic groups.  Following the dissolution of the USSR, most of the 
substantial German population and many of the Russian population chose to emigrate, 
                                                           
7 At purchasing power parity the Central Asian countries’ incomes are higher.  By the PPP estimates of 
Maddison (2001, 183-5), Tajikistan’s 1998 per capita GDP of I$830 was about the same as that of Haiti 
or Bangladesh, only Afghanistan had lower per capita GDP in Asia, and in Africa only thirteen of the 
42  countries  for  which  Maddison  provides  estimates  had  lower  per  capita  GDP  than  Tajikistan.  
According to  the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2002, Tajikistan’s 2000 GNI per capita 
at PPP was $1090; corresponding figures for the Kyrgyz Republic are $270 and $2540 (PPP), for 
Uzbekistan  $360  and  $2360  (PPP),  for  Turkmenistan  $750  and  $3820  (PPP),  and  for  Kazakhstan 
$1260 and $5490 (PPP). As emphasized above, care needs to be taken in interpreting the national 
accounts data, and PPP conversions are even less firmly based. 
8 Uzbekistan's relatively good GDP performance during the 1990s may in part be a statistical artifact 
due to fewer under-reported unofficial activities and some overvaluation of the official economy, but 
this is not the whole explanation (Taube and Zettelmeyer, 1998). 
9 The econometric literature is reviewed in Pomfret (2002, 90-3) and in World Bank (2002). 
10 The idea of a threshold value beyond which inflation is harmful to growth was popularized by Bruno 
and Easterly (1998), although their threshold of forty percent now appears too high.  Focusing only on 
transition economies, Christoffersen and Doyle (1998) estimated a threshold of thirteen percent.   6 
and  the  emigrants  tended  to  come  from  among  the  better  educated,  thus  eroding 
Kazakhstan’s human capital advantage.  The large remaining Russian population was 
heavily concentrated in the north and east, close to the Russian border, and posing a 
potential secessionist threat, which had a powerful political influence.  Kazakhstan’s 
president was the major advocate of retaining some form of common economic space 
with Russia and the national capital was relocated at great expense from Almaty in the 
southeast to Astana in the centre north.   
  The  second  obstacle  to  fulfilling  Kazakhstan’s  economic  potential  was 
connected to the oil sector.  The only outlets for Kazakhstan’s oil were pipelines 
through Russia, and Russia exploited its monopoly position by regulating flows and 
levying  high  tariffs.    Despite  many  plans  for  alternative  pipelines,  the  position  a 
decade after independence was essentially unchanged with small amounts of oil being 
shipped across the Caspian Sea but most still being exported through Russia. 
  Oil played a key role in Kazakhstan’s economic and political development.  
The  privatization  program  of  the  mid-1990s  led  to  insiders  and  politically  well-
connected people gaining control over the valuable assets.  The regime became more 
autocratic and the system more corrupt.  Economic reform stalled in the mid-1990s, 
and in 1995 Kazakhstan ranked behind both the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan 
according to the EBRD transition indices. 
  Explanation  of  Kazakhstan’s  disappointing  economic  performance  over  the 
period 1992-5, when estimated GDP fell by almost half, is over-determined.  The 
initial conditions in terms of resource abundance proved to be negative, because the 
resources could not be exported at world prices and because of the associated political 
economy factors.  The limited extent of economic reform and crony capitalism also 
inhibited healthy economic development in the mid-1990s.  In 1996-7 Kazakhstan’s 
economy began to grow, but it was hard-hit by the 1998 Russian crisis.  Although the 
crisis itself was exogenous, the contagion effect reflected a relative failure to diversify 
Kazakhstan’s international economic relations away from Russia. 
  After  1999  the  economic  situation  in  Kazakhstan  turned  around  (Pomfret, 
2005).  The recovery from the 1998 crisis was driven by market forces and by good 
fortune.  A sharp real depreciation of the currency stimulated exports and helped to 
validate policymakers’ understanding of market mechanisms.  Recovery of world oil 
prices, which had stagnated from 1986 to 1998 (Figure 2), reinforced the positive 
trade developments, while large new offshore oil discoveries and new pipeline routes 
created unbounded optimism. 
 
2.2 The Kyrgyz Republic 
 
The  Kyrgyz  Republic  was  a  poor  mountainous  Soviet  republic  with  few  natural 
resources.    Its  economy  was  tightly  linked  to  the  Union  economy  and  suffered 
substantially from the dissolution of the USSR.
11  Although the Kyrgyz were in the 
majority, there was a large Slav minority in the north and a large Uzbek population in 
the  south  of  the  country.    The  Soviet  republic  was  associated  with  economic 
backwardness and conservatism,  but a fortuitous combination of events led to the 
appointment in 1990 of a physics professor as First Secretary.   
                                                           
11 The largest single enterprise, a sugar refinery which accounted for 3% of GNP in 1991, used cane 
sugar  from  Cuba  as  the  raw  material  and  this  supply  link  broke  down  completely.    Other  large 
industrial  enterprises  were  part  of  the  Soviet  military-industrial  complex  and  also  encountered 
breakdown of their demand and supply chains after 1990.   7 
  From 1993 to 1998 the Kyrgyz Republic was by far the most reformist of the 
Central Asian republics.  Whether this was because President Akayev was the most 
liberal leader or whether he had fewest options is debated.  In May 1993 the Kyrgyz 
Republic  was  the  first  Central  Asian  country  to  replace  the  ruble  by  a  national 
currency, and unlike the other countries this was explicitly part of an economic reform 
program  aimed  at  curbing  inflation  so  that  relative  prices  could  direct  resource 
allocation.  The Kyrgyz Republic received the most support from the international 
financial institutions, and following their standard policy recommendations brought 
annual inflation down below 50% in 1995.  Prices were liberalized, the currency made 
convertible, and tariffs reduced.  In July 1998 the Kyrgyz Republic became the first 
Soviet successor state to accede to the WTO.   
  Small-scale privatization also progressed rapidly.  In other areas, however, 
reform was less smooth.  Land privatization was delayed until 1998 and, even when 
accepted in principle, a five-year moratorium on transfer of ownership was imposed.  
Large-scale privatization also proved difficult in practice, partly due to unrealistic 
pricing of assts.  The only large productive enterprise with a positive output record 
was the Kumtor goldmine operated as a joint venture with a Canadian company.  The 
Kumtor mine was accounting for a sixth of GDP by the early 2000s, but front-loading 
of returns to the foreign investor limited the benefits accruing to Kyrgyz residents.
12  
Institutional reforms were often impressive on paper, but implementation was poor. 
  Economic performance was similar to that of Kazakhstan, with a substantial 
output decline followed by economic growth in 1996 and 1997.  Whether this was a 
better achievement depends on a comparison of the initial conditions, which many 
saw  as  less  favourable  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic,  and  on  evaluation  of  the  role  of 
foreign assistance.  The Kyrgyz Republic was successful in cutting inflation, and yet 
it  ran  large  fiscal  deficits  as  tax  revenues  fell  and  public  expenditures  were  not 
reduced in line; the general government budget deficit was reduced from a high of 
17% of GDP in 1995 but was still 10-11% of GDP in 1999-2000 (Mogilevsky and 
Hasanov, 2004, 227).  The situation was sustained by substantial  IMF and World 
Bank financial aid, which enabled the central bank to limit inflationary financing of 
the budget deficit, but which led to a rapid build-up of external debt.   
  The fragility of the Kyrgyz economy was exposed by the 1998 Russian crisis.  
Although the Kyrgyz economy was less closely linked to Russia than Kazakhstan’s 
economy was, the contagion effects were strong because the Kyrgyz financial sector 
was weak.  Three of the country’s four largest banks were liquidated in 1998/9 and 
banking sector assets fell from $160 million to $90 million at the end of 2000, i.e. 
from ten percent of GDP to seven percent.  The apparently extensive financial reforms 
of the mid-1990s were revealed to be fragile, and this was symbolic of much of the 
reform structure.   
  One  consequence  of  the  financial  crisis  was  to  stimulate  a  re-thinking  of 
economic policies.  Concerns over the country’s rising debt burden also contributed to 
rethinking of the adherence to the policies recommended by the international financial 
institutions,  whose  adoption  was  now  seen  as  having  been  costly.    After  1998, 
economic reforms were placed on hold for several years, although they began to move 
forward again in the early 2000s.   
  Economic performance in the Kyrgyz Republic in the 1990s is difficult to 
evaluate.  Its role as the reform leader in Central Asia led to anticipation of healthy 
                                                           
12 Kumtor accounted for over two-fifths of industrial output and its share of GDP was 16% in the first 
quarter of 2001; Centre for Social and Economic Research in Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyz Economic Outlook 
2/2001, 9.   8 
growth.  That this was not realized could be ascribed to poor initial conditions, poor 
implementation of reforms, or not staying the course after 1998. 
 
 2.3 Tajikistan 
 
Tajikistan  shared  many  of  the  Kyrgyz  Republic’s  disadvantages,  but  these  were 
compounded by a civil war in which tens of thousands were killed and half a million 
people were displaced in the first year after independence.  The war fluctuated hot and 
cold  over  the  next  five  years  until  the  1997  peace  agreement  brought  opposition 
parties into the government.  Roads, bridges and other infrastructure were destroyed 
during the fighting, and much has still not been repaired.  Many men left the country 
either for economic reasons or to avoid the draft.  
  After 1997 government policies appeared to be fairly liberal.  The government 
courted  the  international  financial  institutions  and  largely  followed  their  policy 
recommendations.  Implementation has, however, been poor, especially in the late 
1990s  when  the  central  government  did  not  have  full  control  over  the  national 
territory.    After  September  2001  President  Rahmonov  became  more  assertive  in 
cleansing the government of opposition figures, with the tacit support of the west 
which  approved  of  his  secular  position  and  mistrusted  the  Islamic  parties,  and  in 
establishing government control, but local warlords, outside the formal structure of 
the  government  or  the  pre-1997  opposition,  continued  to  operate  on  their  own 
account.    The  years  of  war  and  the  burgeoning  narcotics  trade  hampered  the 
emergence of civil society. 
  Economic performance in the 1990s was disastrous.  Output fell by two thirds 
in the early and mid 1990s.  Lack of economic opportunity led many men to migrate 
to Russia in search of work and, because their remittances were largely brought back 
as  cash  and  unreported,  it  is  difficult  to  estimate  how  much  this  contributed  to 
incomes.  Foreign assistance, mainly from Russia, was primarily military aid, which 
contributed  little  to  the  economy  apart  from  leaving  Tajikistan  with  the  highest 
debt/GDP ratio of any Soviet successor state.  Although the economy began to grow 




The Turkmenistan economy, although historically one of the poorest republics in the 
USSR, was experiencing rapid growth in the final Soviet decades based on cotton and 
natural gas.  The construction of the Karakum Canal, begun in the 1950s, greatly 
increased  the  land  area  under  cotton.    In  the  1980s  the  natural  gas  sector  was 
modernized and production expanded rapidly.  The shift from Soviet to world prices 
offered larger terms of trade gains to Turkmenistan than to any other Soviet successor 
state (Tarr, 1994), but the inherited infrastructure directed energy exports exclusively 
to  the  CIS  and  the  monopsonistic  buyers  quickly  ran  up  substantial  arrears.
13 
Turkmenistan eventually addressed the problem by the drastic measure of cutting off 
gas supply to delinquent customers between March 1997 and January 1999.  This is 
                                                           
13  The  arrears  complicated  Turkmenistan’s  national  accounts  because  gas  sales  were  recorded  as 
exports valued at the contract price.  The arrears appeared in the capital account of the balance of 
payments as capital outflows from Turkmenistan, even though the foreign assets being accumulated 
were worth far less than their face value.  The actual accounts were extremely opaque because revenues 
received from energy and cotton exports went into off-budget funds under the president’s personal 
control.     9 
reflected in the negative GDP growth in 1997, when other countries had begun to 
recover (Table 1), but Turkmenistan’s economic problems run deeper than a simple 
strategic blip in the late 1990s. 
  The  economy  remained  essentially  unreformed.    The  central  planning 
mechanisms broke down in the early 1990s, but were not replaced by a functioning 
market economy.  Retaining centralized  control over resource allocation decisions 
was relatively easy given the simple structure of the economy and the relatively easy 
to  monitor  revenues  from  cotton  and  gas  exports,  but  was  very  inefficient.    The 
government  kept  tight  control  over  the  farm  sector  with  a  system  similar  to 
Uzbekistan's state marketing monopoly and with forex controls which were tightened 
after 1998.  Repressive agricultural policies (Pastor and van Rooden: 2000) and poor 
management  led  to  cotton  yields  falling  by  much  more  than  in  neighbouring 
Uzbekistan, and export revenues declined sharply over the 1990s (Pomfret, 2008a).  
The energy sector also remained under tight presidential control; production declined 
drastically  during  the  1990s  and  little  was  done  to  exploit  the  potentially  large 
offshore reserves  (Table 5), but  output  remained sufficient  after 2000 to generate 
sufficient export earnings for the President's needs.  
  The data for Turkmenistan are the least reliable of any economy in transition 
and are manipulated for political impact.  Nevertheless, it was clear to any observer 
that  economic  conditions  deteriorated  substantially  after  independence,  especially 
outside the capital city.   
   
2.5 Uzbekistan 
 
Uzbekistan is the most populous of the Central Asian countries and its record since 
independence is the most controversial.  Initial conditions were at first seen as neutral 
and its economic reforms were cautious, but during the 1990s Uzbekistan was the 
most successful of all Soviet successor states - including the rapidly reforming and 
geographically  advantaged  Baltic  countries  -  in  terms  of  output  performance 
(Pomfret, 2000; Spechler, 2000).  The Uzbek government had frosty relations with the 
international  financial  institutions,  and  this  may  have  clouded  judgments  of  what 
became known as the Uzbek puzzle: how to explain the good economic performance 
of a lagging economic reformer?   
  Uzbekistan illustrates the difficulty of determining what are favourable initial 
conditions.    Its  major  export,  cotton,  was  not  under-priced  in  the  USSR,  so 
Uzbekistan did not have the expected terms of trade gains that energy producers like 
Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan anticipated.  On the other hand, cotton was not restricted 
to fixed transport modes and it could be fairly easily exported to new markets.  Up to 
1996 this advantage was enhanced by buoyant world prices for cotton (Figure 1).  
Uzbekistan’s second most valuable export, gold (Table 4), was even easier to export 
at world prices. 
  Another favourable initial condition was Tashkent’s position as the regional 
capital  of  Soviet  Central  Asia.    At  a  physical  level,  the  principle  that  the  Soviet 
successor states inherited assets in their territory meant that Uzbekistan gained the 
biggest air fleet and most military equipment in Central Asia.  Less tangibly, but 
perhaps more important, Uzbekistan inherited the most effective administrators in the 
region.  The physical infrastructure, including both the domestic transport network 
and the irrigation canals crucial to the cotton economy, was relatively well kept up.  
Corruption was, and still is, widespread in all of Central Asia, but available evidence   10 
suggested lower levels in Uzbekistan than in the other four countries,
14 implying more 
effective  central  control  and  (admittedly  by  the  low  standards  of  the  region)  a 
relatively high sense of public service. 
The Uzbek puzzle is partly a matter of over-estimating performance, but it has 
much more to do with under-estimating reform progress and, especially, failure to 
recognize the key importance of infrastructure and the institutional setting in which 
markets function.  Uzbekistan is not an open society and this may stifle economic 
progress,  but  having  a  relatively  well-managed  economy  helped  to  minimize  the 
extent of the transitional recession and gradual reform was sufficient to provide the 
basis for modest but reasonably steady growth after the mid 1990s. 
  This is not to discount the potential cost of Uzbekistan’s clearly misguided 
policies.  The history of regional administration contributed to a stronger sense of 
independence  in  policy  making.    Uzbekistan  was  sceptical  of  foreign  advice,  and 
unwilling to accumulate foreign debt, so its relations with the international financial 
institutions were frosty.  The scepticism delayed recognition of the importance of 
macropolicy  measures  to  contain  inflation,  but  this  was  not  critical  for  long-term 
development as the inflation rate was coming down by 1996 (Table 2).  Much more 
important was the renunciation of commitments to establish currency convertibility 
and resort to forex controls after cotton prices declined in 1996.   Such controls can 
have  a  short-term  stabilizing  impact,  but  the  substantial  long-term  resource 
misallocation  costs  are  familiar  from  other  countries  that  have  relied  on  similar 
agricultural taxes (Pomfret, 2000; 2008a). Although the government recognized their 
cost by the end of the 1990s, the forex controls were a stumbling block to reform, 
even as the government professed a desire to abolish them.  An overvalued official 
exchange rate enabled the state as monopoly buyer of cotton to extract large rents 
from farmers (effectively the difference between the world price and the domestic 
price),  sheltered  domestic  producers  of  import-competing  goods  from  foreign 
competition and allowed people with access to foreign currency to profit from the 
black market.  All of these consequences created vested interests who benefitted from 
the regulated system and opposed reforms and, even after the controls were formally 
abolished  in  late  2003,  many  practical  limitations  on  access  to  foreign  exchange 
remained.  Whereas in the 1990s Uzbekistan had jockeyed with its regional rival, 
Kazakhstan,  for  hegemony  in  Central  Asia,  after  2000  Uzbekistan  fell  behind 
Kazakhstan in terms of economic power and political significance.  
   
2.6 Conclusions 
 
The  five  countries’  differing  economic  performance  in  the  1990s  to  some  extent 
reflected  policy  choices,  but  was  also  determined  by  resource  endowment  and  in 
Tajikistan's  case  by  civil  war.    Attempts  to  transplant  western  institutions  into  a 
Central Asian setting did not have the anticipated success in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
because too many other conditions for a successful market economy were lacking.  
On the other hand, ignoring the advice of economists failed to bring greater economic 
grief  to  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  in  the  1990s  than  to  the  more  reformist 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic.  Indeed, good economic management drawing on 
Soviet-era  administrative  structures  helped  Uzbekistan  to  weather  the  transitional 
                                                           
14  See,  for  example,  the  results  of  the  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise  Performance  survey 
reported in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development’s Transition Report 1999.  Among 
the twenty transition economies covered by the 1999 BEEPS, Uzbekistan ranked about fourth for lack 
of corruption, ahead of several East European countries generally considered to be transition leaders.   11 
recession  better  than  other  former  Soviet  republics  or  most  eastern  European 
countries. 
Resource  endowment  played  an  important  part.    Uzbekistan’s  good 
performance  in  the  first  half  of  the  1990s  was  helped  by  buoyant  cotton  prices, 
although the Uzbek government also managed to maintain productivity in the cotton 
sector better than Turkmenistan or Tajikistan.  Turkmenistan also  benefitted from 
cotton prices and from large gas exports, although the revenues were largely used to 
support a highly personalized regime rather than for the public good.  Kazakhstan's 
disappointing performance, compared to perceived potential in 1992, was in part due 
to stagnant oil prices before 1998.  The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan are both 
resource-poor  and  became  economically  poor,  although  the  latter's  economic 
performance was significantly worse due to civil war.  
 
 
3. Economic Performance in the Second Decade 
 
In  prospect  many  foreign  observers  expected  the  longer  term  relative  economic 
performance to reward those countries which had bit the bullet of seriously reforming 
their systems in the 1990s to create effective market economies while punishing those 
countries  which  had  held  back  on  reform.    In  practice,  the  outcome  was 
overwhelmingly  determined  by  whether  countries  had  energy  resources  or  not.  
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan both enjoyed rapid growth driven by the rising world 
price of oil, which had stagnated in the dozen years before 1998, but then increased 
from under $10 a barrel to $140 in 2008, before plummeting to under $40 (Figure 2).  
Tajikistan  enjoyed  fairly  high  growth  rates  in  2000-4  as  domestic  peace  was 
established, but this was from a low base and the country remained very poor.  A huge 
percentage of the male population works abroad, mainly in Russia, and remittances 
are the country’s major source of foreign exchange; although data are sketchy, the 
share of remittances in GDP is perhaps the highest in the world (Kireyev, 2006).  
Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic had the slowest economic growth (Table 1).  
A striking feature of the decade 1998-2008 is the lack of further progress in 
creating  an  efficient  market  economy.    As  measured  by  the  EBRD  Transition 
Indicators (Table 3) there was little change, apart from Tajikistan completing its price 
liberalization and small-scale privatization, and some banking reform in Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan.  Turkmenistan was even downgraded on some 
indicators of its, very limited, transition in the 1990s.  The general impression from 
Table 3 is of a blank slate for reform in the early 1990s to which Central Asian 
countries responded to differing degrees, but by the turn of the century the type of 
market  economy  had  been  fixed  in  each  country  and  was  now  only  amenable  to 
limited further change. 
 
3.1 The Energy Boom 
 
The dominant economic influence in Central Asia from 1999 to 2008 was the boom in 
energy prices.  The oilboom was especially important for Kazakhstan whose major 
Caspian oilfields began to produce large quantities of oil after the turn of the century, 
as the first independent pipeline through Russia opened in 2001 and the first pipeline 
to Turkey opened in 2005.  Thus Kazakhstan benefitted from both higher quantity and 
higher prices, as well as being in a stronger position to negotiate transit fees.   12 
Increased oil prices affected demand for substitutes.  There is no world market 
for natural gas but Russian exports to the EU are priced by a formula that includes oil 
prices, and increases in those prices created pressure to increase the price of Central 
Asian  gas  exports  to  Russia  -  or  for  Central  Asian  exporters  to  seek  alternative 
pipeline routes with higher long-term price agreements.  For Turkmenistan, whose gas 
reserves are among the world's ten largest, the increase in energy prices was also a 
boon,  even  though  gas  prices  were  more  dependent  on  long-term  contracts  with 
customers on the pipeline network. 
Finally, growing energy demand stimulated new projects to harness the huge 
hydroelectric  potential  in  the  mountainous  regions  of  Tajikistan  and  the  Kyrgyz 
Republic.  Any hydro projects are, however, highly controversial because the rivers 
provide  water  vital  to  the  irrigated  agriculture  of  Kazakhstan,  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan.  In the Soviet era water resources were managed by Moscow, so that 
water would be released at appropriate times for downstream agriculture and in return 
the Kyrgyz and Tajik republics would be provided with energy.  Since independence 
there have been no major new hydro projects and the energy/water swap arrangements 
continue.  Nevertheless, tensions remain.  In the severe winter of 2007-8 Uzbekistan 
failed to supply as much power as Tajikistan needed.
15  In the winter of 2008-89 
tensions rose between Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, driven in part by Kyrgyz 
plans  to  develop  the  Kambarata  complex  of  hydro  power  stations  despite  Uzbek 
opposition. 
For Uzbekistan the direct impact of the oilboom was roughly neutral, because 
the country is more or less self-sufficient in oil and, especially, natural gas.  However, 
the indirect effects were substantial.  Tensions with neighbouring Tajikistan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic escalated over water/energy arrangements as the upstream countries 
became keener to use their water resources to generate electricity.  The economic 
prosperity of Kazakhstan also posed a challenge to the Uzbek government that had 
seen itself as the regional leader in the 1990s.  Tashkent had been the metropolis of 
Soviet Central  Asia and Uzbekistan with about  25 million people  (growing to  27 
million in the 2000s) was the most populous of the new independent countries, while 
Kazakhstan with 17 million people, falling to 15 million due to emigration, had a 
higher per capita income and a similar GDP to Uzbekistan.  After 2000 Uzbekistan's 
standing relative to Kazakhstan fell substantially. By the mid-2000s  thousands of 
Uzbek workers were crossing the border to work as migrant labour in Kazakhstan, 
underlining the widening gap in living standards, especially as South Kazakhstan was 
the poorest part of the country. 
Relations with external powers were also driven in part by energy geopolitics.  
The USA championed the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Erzurum gas pipeline, 
which  opened  in  2005  and  2006  respectively  and  reduced  Central  Asian  energy 
producers’ dependence on Russia for transit.
16  China also became a major presence.  
Chinese  oil  companies  became  more  active  in  Kazakhstan  (highlighted  by  the 
purchase of PetroKazakhstan from its Canadian owners in 2005) and construction of a 
pipeline to the Chinese border commenced.  President Niyazov, who rarely travelled, 
made  a  high  profile  trip  to  Beijing  in  April  2006,  following  which  the  Chinese 
National  Petroleum  Corporation  was  granted  drilling  rights  in  Turkmenistan  and 
                                                           
15 Much of Tajikistan's hydroelectricity is used by a single aluminium smelter that is the country's main 
source of foreign exchange earnings. 
16 US opposition thwarted significant energy exports via Iran, despite it having the closest access to 
ocean  transport,  and  security  conditions  worked  against  pipelines  via  Afghanistan  to  the  booming 
energy markets of South Asia.   13 
construction  began  on  a  gas  pipeline  from  Turkmenistan  to  China.    Meanwhile, 
Russia tried to shore up its monopoly position but was hampered by technical and 
perhaps capital shortages, and announced pipeline projects languished.  An important 
consequence of this confluence of developments was to encourage cooperation among 
Turkmenistan,  Kazakhstan  and  Uzbekistan  in  agreeing  routes  and  transit  fees  on 
pipelines that ran through the three countries to China and in negotiating jointly on the 
price of Central Asian gas exports to Russia.  
 
3.2  Domestic Political Developments 
 
By  the  early  2000s  the  presidents  had  created  super-presidential  systems,  and 
remained  in  power  by  more  or  less  undemocratic  means.    Opposition  was  fairly 
ruthlessly  crushed  and  civil  society  was  slow  to  emerge.  Nevertheless,  both  the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan remained relatively open societies, where domestic 
opposition was vociferous even if operating under duress. 
In the Kyrgyz Republic dissension had a regional dimension as opposition 
centred in the south of the country, objecting to a perceived northern bias of President 
Akayev’s  government.    After  disputed  elections  in  February  and  March  2005, 
demonstrations  initially  in  the  south  and  then  in  the  national  capital  led  to  the 
resignation of President Akayev in April.  Following the revolutions in Georgia in 
2003  and  in  Ukraine  in  2005,  this  was  the  first  regime  change  in  Central  Asia.  
However, President Akayev, despite resorting to rule by decree and acquiescing in the 
enrichment of relatives and friends, was always the most liberal Central Asian leader. 
There is doubt over whether the post-Akayev regime truly represents a new political 
situation or simply the same political system with different leaders. 
In Kazakhstan, the regime remains autocratic and dissent is punished, but the 
president is facing growing pressures for accountability of himself and his entourage.  
Corruption scandals undermined the government, especially the “Kazakhgate” affair 
associated with a concealed Swiss bank account into which President Nazarbayev 
reportedly deposited over a billion dollars in oil revenues and which is the subject of 
inquiries  by  US  prosecutors.    The  opposition  has  been  led  by  powerful  political 
figures  who  have  defected  from  the  government,  often  in  response  to  the 
centralization of power in the President’s family, and by businessmen, who gained 
from the 1990s privatization and now want to strengthen the rule of law in order to 
protect their gains.  The “New Kazakhs” opposition became more open in late 2001, 
and the government responded harshly in 2002, but the subsequent stand-off reflected 
the  strength  of  the  opposition.    After  the  Ukraine  elections  of  December  2004, 
Kazakhstan’s  government  again  reacted  harshly,  closing  down  one  of  the  main 
opposition parties, but the situation remained fluid.  In the December 2005 election 
Presidential supporters fixed the ballot to record over 90% support for the incumbent, 
which was especially disappointing because indicators of public opinion suggested 
that in the booming economic conditions President Nazarbayev would have won a fair 
election.    Nevertheless,  despite  the  undemocratic  and  ruthless  methods  used  to 
maintain power, Kazakhstan’s political contest has been largely non-violent. 
Political opposition has been more violent in Uzbekistan, and has accentuated 
border  tensions.    After  a  series  of  assassinations  of  public  officials  in  1997,  the 
Uzbekistan  government  arrested  hundreds  of  people  in  a  1998  crackdown.    In 
February 1999 five bombs exploded in downtown Tashkent, killing several people 
and injuring over a hundred; the biggest one outside the Cabinet of Ministers building 
was apparently targeted at the President.  In August 1999 some 650 gunmen from the   14 
Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan  (IMU)  were  caught  entering  Uzbekistan,  and 
attempts to bomb the insurgents’ bases hit the wrong targets, killing several Kyrgyz 
civilians  and  Tajik  cows  and  undermining  Uzbekistan’s  reputation  for  military 
effectiveness.    Following  several  sketchily  reported  episodes  of  violence  in 
Namangan and Fergana, the most dramatic events in the Ferghana Valley occurred in 
Andijan in May 2005.  The details are disputed, but a large demonstration in the 
central  square  was  fired  upon  by  troops  leaving  hundreds  of  people  dead.    The 
Andijan events clearly signalled the will of Uzbekistan’s government to use force to 
put down dissent. 
Turkmenistan,  the  most  repressive  regime  in  the  region,  faced  the  first 
succession  due  to  natural  causes  when  Turkmenbashi  died  in  December  2006.  
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov became acting President, and in the February 2007 
presidential  election  Berdymukhamedov  won  almost  90%  of  the  vote.    In  the 
remainder of 2007 he consolidated his power, operating a super-presidential regime 
similar  to  that  of  his  predecessor.    Although  the  change  of  president  fuelled 
anticipation  of  policy  change,  in  Berdymukhamedov  first  two  years  publicized 
changes were largely cosmetic and serious economic reforms minimal.   
 
4. The International Context
17 
 
Before 1992 Central Asia was part of an integrated economic space.  Despite many 
agreements  to  strengthen  the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  (CIS)  as  an 
economic  zone,  there  was  little  implementation  and  attempts  to  retain  a  common 
currency broke down in 1993. The CIS as an organization floundered in 1992-4 as 
Russia chose to act unilaterally in regional conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova, 
and more or less unilaterally in Tajikistan, and as economic issues were pushed into 
the background.  By 1996 over half of the five Central Asian countries' foreign trade 
was outside the old Soviet area. 
During 1992 the Central Asian leaders were primarily concerned with nation-
building.  Accession to the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the 
World  Bank  provided  an  external  dimension  to  national  sovereignty.    The  five 
countries also joined the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and various non-
economic regional organizations in 1992, largely as a statement of their independence 
from the Soviet Union and as an assertion of their distinctive non-Russian Islamic 
culture, but they made no substantive concessions of national policy autonomy in 
participating in any regional organization. ECO, which includes all of the non-Arab 
Islamic countries in Asia west of India (Pomfret, 1999), has been largely ineffective.
18 
During  the  mid-1990s  Russia  attempted  to  re-establish  its  influence  over 
Central Asia.  Faced with a delicate ethnic balance between Kazakhs and Russians, 
President  Nazarbayev  of  Kazakhstan  tried  to  deflect  the  impending  Russian 
dominance into a more cooperative structure by promoting a Eurasian customs union.  
Tajikistan, which was dependent on Russian military support during the civil war, and 
the Kyrgyz Republic followed this lead.  The Kyrgyz Republic was, however, more 
                                                           
17  This  section  draws  on  my  contribution  to  the  Asian  Development  Bank  project  Institutions  for 
Regionalism: Enhancing Asia's Economic Cooperation and Integration.  Linn (2004) highlights the 
process of disintegration in Central Asia. 
18 ECO has three founding members, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, plus Afghanistan Azerbaijan and the 
Central Asian countries which all joined in 1992.  The Secretariat is in Tehran.   15 
externally oriented and since its 1998 accession to the World Trade Organization with 
low bound tariff rates completion of a customs union with Russia seems infeasible.
19 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were resistant both to Russian regional designs 
and to falling too much under the influence of multilateral organizations.  Although 
nominally  a  CIS  member  Turkmenistan  ceased  to  even  provide  statistics  to  the 
secretariat.
20  Turkmenistan,  with  substantial  export  earnings  from  natural  gas  and 
cotton, adopted an autarchic political position, seeking United Nations guarantees of 
its neutrality.
21  Uzbekistan, by contrast became more prominent on the international 
stage as President Karimov first sought to portray himself as the region’s leader, and 
then in 1995-6 Uzbekistan became the most prominent regional ally of the USA.
22  
Concerns  about  potential  Uzbek  hegemony  pushed  Kazakhstan  and  the  Kyrgyz 
Republic, which also fears Uzbek irredentist claims to its territory, closer to Russia.  
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan became members of the Union of 
Five (with Russia and Belarus) and of the Shanghai Forum (with Russia and China). 
The  August  1998  Russian  financial  crisis  had  strong  contagion  effects  on 
Kazakhstan  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  on  the  Kyrgyz  Republic.
23  Uzbekistan  was 
relatively  insulated  from  the  Russian  crisis.    Failing  to  make  much  progress  in 
establishing a Central  Asian community under its  leadership, Uzbekistan formally 
aligned itself in 1999 with the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) 
countries, whose raison d’être was collective resistance to Russian influence.
24  The 
years 1998-9 saw the division of Central Asia into two opposing camps. In October 
2000 the Union of Five was renamed the Eurasian Economic Community. 
This division eased in 2000 and 2001 in part due to the incursion of Islamic 
fighters into the Fergana Valley, presenting a common problem to the three countries 
whose  territory  was  involved  (Uzbekistan,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Tajikistan).  
China played a catalytic role in bringing the Central Asian countries together.  In 
1997-8  China  had  been  an  economic  anchor  in  East  Asia  and  had  sought  closer 
relations with the USA, but it gradually came to resent a perceived asymmetry in this 
rapprochement, which brought little gain to China.  After the US bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in spring 1999, China embraced Japanese proposals for 
Asian monetary cooperation (which were opposed by the USA) and promoted a more 
formal  successor  to  the  Shanghai  Forum.    At  the  June  2001  summit  Uzbekistan 
                                                           
19 A common external tariff at Kyrgyz rates would be unacceptable to Russia, but a tariff structure 
close to Russia's would impose substantial economic costs on the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan 
(Tumbarello, 2005), as well as forcing the former to renege on its WTO commitments.  Kazakhstan's 
WTO application has moved slowly; a draft Report of the Working Party, which typically indicates that 
the endgame of accession negotiations has been reached, was prepared in May 2005 but completion of 
the negotiations always seems to be expected "next year".  Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also have WTO 
applications in process, but they are further from completion. 
20 Sakwa and Webber (1999) provide a general account of the CIS in the 1990s. 
21 The UN General Assembly formally recognized Turkmenistan’s  neutrality in a resolution of 12 
December  1995  (Freitag-Wirminghaus,  1998;  Werner,  2001).  On  Turkmenistan’s  neutrality,  see 
Pomfret (2008b). 
22 On occasion only Israel and Uzbekistan voted with the USA at the United Nations, and at the May 
1996 ECO summit Uzbekistan’s denunciation of Iran was so vitriolic that the summit ended a day 
earlier than planned.  In July 1996 President Karimov was warmly received by President Clinton in 
Washington  DC.    For  more  details  of  Uzbekistan’s  evolving  foreign  economic  policies,  see  Bohr 
(1998), Pomfret (2000) and Spechler (1999). 
23 The main impact on the Kyrgyz economy was to destroy the banking system, which subsequently 
became  dominated by Kazakh banks. 
24  Uzbekistan  formally  joined  the  four  GUAM  countries  in  1999,  effectively  withdrew  from  the 
alliance in 2002, and withdrew de jure in May 2005.   16 
became the sixth  member and the Forum  was  renamed the Shanghai  Cooperation 
Organization (SCO).  Although Russia saw the SCO as a vehicle for its leadership in 
Central  Asia,  for  the  Central  Asian  leaders,  especially  Uzbekistan,  the  SCO  was 
palatable  because  of  China’s  counterweight.    Nevertheless,  the  regional  faultline 
persisted  as  Kazakhstan,  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Tajikistan  participated  in  the 
Russian-led Collective Security Treaty and Uzbekistan did not. 
The events of September 2001 and the overthrow of the Taliban government 
in Afghanistan provided a major milestone in the region’s international relations.  The 
Central Asian leaders, along with those of Russia and China, gave verbal support to 
the US-led war on terrorism.  Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic went further by 
providing material assistance such as making airbases available to the US military.  
These developments upped the international perceptions of Central Asia’s strategic 
significance.  Russia, although officially supporting the USA, attempted to reassert its 
own influence.
25 
The US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 provided a second milestone.  It 
highlighted the possibility that the USA might invade a country not only to rid it of 
religious fanatics like the Taliban but also to rid it of an autocratic secular regime.  
Coinciding  with  growing  western  criticism  of  repression  in  Uzbekistan  (and 
Turkmenistan), this provided a backdrop to a reversal of allegiances in Central Asia.
26  
Uzbekistan ordered the closure of the US base on its territory in July 2005 (Gleason, 
2006), and moved closer to Russia, joining the Eurasian Community in October 2005.  
This  was  accompanied  by  formal  dissolution  of  the  Central  Asian  Cooperation 
Organization, to which the four Central Asian EurAsEc members also belonged, so 
that after 2005 there was no specifically Central Asian regional institution and the two 
main active regional organizations had their secretariats in Moscow (EurAsEc) and 
Beijing (SCO).  Symbolic of the resurgence of Russian influence was the agreement 
signed in May 2007 by Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to build a gas pipeline 
along the eastern coast of the Caspian, feeding into the Russian pipeline network.
27 
Even  as  the  realignment  to  the  authoritarian  regimes  of  Russia  and  China 
peaked,  there  were  signs  that  the  Central  Asian  countries  wished  to  maintain  a 
counter-balance.  The Kyrgyz Republic paid lip-service to, but failed to comply with, 
                                                           
25 Especially after the expansion of NATO in eastern Europe at the November 2002 Prague summit, 
President Putin tried to obtain recognition of Russian hegemony over Central Asia and the Caucasus as 
a quid pro quo for his acquiescence in the NATO enlargement.  President Karimov of Uzbekistan, 
however, had a fairly high profile at Prague, meeting President Jacques Chirac and Secretary of State 
Colin  Powell,  who  praised  “the  practical  actions  of  Uzbekistan  in  the  international  fight  against 
terrorism” (quoted at  http://www.press-service.uz/eng/vizits_eng/ve21112002.htm by the press service 
of the President of Uzbekistan).  President Rahmonov of Tajikistan also publicized improved ties with 
France and the USA, making visits to the two countries in December 2002 as a signal of displeasure 
with  Russia’s  deportation  of  Tajik  workers.    By  contrast,  on  18-19  February  2003  President 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, facing US and EU criticisms of his regime’s corruption and human rights 
record, made an official visit to Russia, where he was not criticized for such things. 
26 The EBRD decision to hold its 2003 annual meetings in Tashkent highlighted the gap between 
commitments to democracy and Central Asian realities.  The killing of several hundred demonstrators 
in Andijan by Uzbek security forces in May 2005 was the final catalyst for a break in relations. 
27 The ten billion m
3 a year pipeline would be in addition to the 50+ billion m
3 a year currently flowing 
to Russia As a further  incentives for Turkmenistan to sign the pipeline contract Russia-connected 
companies provided capital, e.g. Itera was a lead investor in the $4 billion development project to turn 
the  area  around  the  Caspian  port of  Turkmenbashi  into  a  tourist  centre.  The  2007  announcement, 
however, failed to pre-empt alternative gas pipeline routes such as that begun from Turkmenistan to 
China a few months later or the Nabucco project, and teh East Caspian project remains a pipe dream..   17 
a  Russian  and  Chinese  inspired  bid  to  eject  all  US  bases  from  the  region.
28  
Kazakhstan also appeared to distance itself from the hard-line authoritarian stance, 
reflecting its renewed independence from Russia as oil prices soared and non-Russian 
pipeline  routes  were  coming  online.    Both  Kazakhstan  and  Turkmenistan,  made 
positive statements about the Nabucco pipeline intended to reduce Russia's dominance 
of EU gas supplies  Tajikistan, while becoming more dependent on remittances from 
migrant  workers  in  Russia's  booming  economy,  grew  increasingly  upset  at  the 
treatment of those workers.
29  Most importantly, the long-term shared interests of 
Uzbekistan  and  the  USA  reasserted  themselves,  and  in  October  2008  Uzbekistan 
announced  its  intention  of  withdrawing  from  EurAsEc.
30  The  USA  and  EU 
reciprocated by playing down human rights concerns.
31 
The international economic relations of the five Central Asian countries have 
evolved  since  independence.    Their  trade  has  increased  substantially,  and  been 
redirected away from former Soviet markets.  The long-term counterpart has been 
adoption  of  multilateral  trade  policies,  even  though  all  Central  Asian  leaders,  to 
varying extent, recognize the desirability of regional cooperation, and use regional 
agreements to signal political allegiance.  The early 2000s saw widening fissures, in 
particular between Uzbekistan and its neighbours, but after the US-led invasion of 
Iraq  there  was  a  rapprochement  between  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  towards  a 
Russia which appeared less sensitive about human rights violations than the USA.  
The most striking features of these changing partnerships is the ongoing influence of 
Russia, the emerging importance of China and other major economic powers, and the 
very  limited  development  of  ties  with  regional  neighbours  with  a  shared  cultural 
heritage.  Many commentators in the early 1990s foresaw a battle between Iran and 
Turkey for the hearts and minds and markets of Central Asia.  Although both have 
increased their Central Asian ties relative to the Soviet era, neither Iran nor Turkey 
has yet established a strong economic or political presence in Central Asia. 
International  economic  relations  could  be  seen  as  a  tug-of-war  between 
western influences in favour of more market-driven economies and Russia as a status 
quo  influence  for  limited  economic  reform.    In  practice,  international  economic 
relations  were  driven  by  geopolitical  interests,  and  the  only  significant  economic 
                                                           
28 In February 2009 the Kyrgyz government finally gave the USA six-months notice to quit the base, 
but this appeared to be a bargaining tactic and indeed a new agreement was signed in July 2009 with no 
apparent disruption of US operations. 
29 A sign of antipathy towards Russian influence was President Rahmonov's announcement in  March 
2007 that he had changed his name to Rahmon, dropping the Russian ending -ov.  He urged other 
Tajiks to follow his example and return to their cultural and national roots. 
30  Although  all  sides  sought  to  keep  the  arrangements  low-key,  by  2009  both  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan  allowed  refuelling  of  aircraft  and  overland  transport  of  supplies  for  US  forces  in 
Afghanistan and humanitarian assistance. 
31 The Central Asian countries continued to score poorly on international rankings of democracy or 
human rights.  For example, in the Freedom House Nations in Transit 2009 Report all five rank among 
the  eight  "consolidated  authoritarian  regimes",  together  with  Belarus,  Azerbaijan  and  Russia.  
Turkmenistan  with  6.93  out  of  7  had  the  lowest  score  among  the  29  eastern  European  and  CIS 
countries surveyed; Uzbekistan scored 6.89, Kazakhstan 6.32, Tajikistan 6.14 and the Kyrgyz Republic 
6.04.  On Kazakhstan's record the Report observed that "Notwithstanding its impending takeover of the 
2010  chairmanship  of  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE),  the 
Kazakhstani government has not taken a single convincing step towards promoting democratic rule, 
aiding political liberalization, establishing genuine tolerance, or creating conditions for the functioning 
of an independent media and civil society".  Every one of the five had lower democracy scores in 2009 
than their 1999/2000 scores of Kyrgyz Republic 5.08, Kazakhstan 5.50, Tajikistan 5.75, Uzbekistan 
6.38 and Turkmenistan 6.75.   18 
element  concerned  oil  and  gas  pipelines.    The  shifting  political  alignments  did, 
however,  have  an  important  indirect  economic  impact  in  that  they  forestalled 
construction  of  specifically  Central  Asian  regional  institutions,  which  has  been  a 
serious shortcoming. Among the issues needing to be addressed at the regional level 




When the five Central Asian countries became unexpectedly independent during the 
second  half  of  1991,  they  faced  three  large  negative  shocks:  the  end  of  central 
planning, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and hyperinflation.  All experienced a 
transitional recession; output fell, inequality widened and poverty increased.  Their 
national experiences, however, diverged during the first decade after independence, 
both  with  respect  to  the  type  of  economic  system  created  and  with  respect  to 
economic performance. 
By the turn of the century, the national economies had changed substantially 
from the centrally planned economy of the Soviet era and all were in one form or 
another  a  market-based  economy.  The  Kyrgyz  Republic  and  Kazakhstan  had 
liberalized prices and trade policy and moved much further on privatization than the 
more regulated economies of Uzbekistan or Turkmenistan.  In Tajikistan prices had 
effectively liberalized and small enterprises were privatized in the chaos of civil war, 
but enterprise restructuring lagged and reform had scarcely begun in the financial 
sector or with respect to infrastructure. 
Expectations that economic performance would be correlated with the speed 
and  extent  of  transition  were  not  borne  out  in  the  1990s.  The  Kyrgyz  Republic, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan had almost identical GDP performance over the decade 
1989-99  (Table 1),  despite  the  extensive reforms  in  the Kyrgyz Republic  and the 
absence  of  reforms  in  Turkmenistan.    Tajikistan's  poor  performance  is  readily 
understandable in terms of the civil war.  Despite limited market-friendly reforms, 
Uzbekistan in the 1990s was economically the most successful of all Soviet successor 
states, an achievement that can be explained by buoyant world cotton prices up to 
1996 and more importantly by the country's relatively good economic management in 
day-to-day matters. 
Expectations  that  longer-term  growth  rates  would  depend  upon  economic 
policies  have  also  not  been  borne  out  in  the  second  decade  since  independence.  
Variations  in  economic  performance  during  the  2000s  were  overwhelmingly 
determined  by  energy  endowments.    High  energy  prices  in  1998-2008  powered 
Kazakhstan's rapid growth, at least until the country ran into a financial crisis in 2008, 
and also supported high growth rates in Turkmenistan (possibly exaggerated in Table 
1) despite poor policies. Meanwhile, Uzbekistan’s regulated economy slipped into the 
low growth familiar from many import-substituting countries of the 1950s and 1960s.  
The  more  market-friendly,  but  resource-poor  and  landlocked,  economies  of  the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan fared even worse.    
 All  five  countries  have  established  super-presidential  political  regimes, 
although the degrees of repression are palpably different.
32  The post-2000 economic 
                                                           
32 This may complicate the assessments of economic performance in the previous paragraph.  The 
greater  liberty  in  the  Kyrgyz  Republic  underpins  a  flourishing  market  culture  and  the  two  largest 
bazaars, in Osh and in Bishkek, cater primarily to Uzbeks; lack of consume choice and extensive 
bureaucratic allocation in Uzbekistan (and in Turkmenistan) may indicate lower economic well-being 
fro a given real GDP.    19 
growth may increase pressure for political change, although national security forces 
still seem to have the situation well under control.  Prospects for significant change in 
economic  policies  in  the  near  future  are  limited  because  the  entrenched  political 
regimes have little incentive to sponsor major reforms.  In sum, a big unknown with 
respect to future economic prospects is the domestic political environment, especially 
in  the  two  largest  economies  where  the  succession  to  Presidents  Karimov  and 
Nazarbayev is unclear.  Fundamental across Central Asia is the question of whether 
an autocratic and repressive political regime is consistent with a flourishing market-
based economy. 
International relations, which were predicted to centre on a new Great Game 
among external powers, have been more muted than anticipated.  During the 1990s 
the low profile of other powers perpetuated Russian hegemony in the region, even 
though Russia's outreach was limited.  After 2000, and especially since 2005, external 
powers' interest increased.  It has primarily focused on energy projects and pipeline 
routes; inflows of non-energy foreign investment have been minimal.   The  Central 
Asian countries have managed to balance competing foreign interests and avoided 
falling under the dominant influence of a foreign power.  An unfortunate consequence 
of the shifting alignments has been to hamper economic cooperation within Central 
Asia, which is essential with respect to water and energy, desirable for trade and 
transit, and perhaps necessary for regional security.     20 
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Table 1: Growth in Real GDP 1989-2008 (per cent) 
 
 
  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  1999; 1989=100 
Kazakhstan  0  0  -13  -3  -9  -13  -8  1  2  -2  2  63 
Kyrgyz Rep  8  3  -5  -19  -16  -20  -5  7  10  2  4  63 
Tajikistan  -3  -2  -7  -29  -11  -19  -13  -4  2  5  4  44 
Turkmenistan  -7  2  -5  -5  -10  -17  -7  -7  -11  5  16  64 
Uzbekistan  4  2  -1  -11  -2  -4  -1  2  3  4  4  94 
 




  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Kazakhstan  -2  3  10  14  10  9  10  10  11  9  3 
Kyrgyz Rep  2  4  5  5  0  7  7  0  3  8  8 
Tajikistan  5  4  8  10  9  10  11  7  7  8  8 
Turkmenistan  7  17  19  20  16  17  15  13  11  12  10 
Uzbekistan  4  4  4  4  4  4  8  7  7  10  9 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report Update, May 2009. 
Notes: 2008 = preliminary actual figures from official government sources. 
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  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Kazakhstan  7  8  13  8  6  6  7  8  9  11  17 
Kyrgyz Rep  11  36  19  7  2  3  4  4  6  10  25 
Tajikistan  43  28  33  39  12  16  7  7  10  13  21 
Turkmenistan  17  24  8  12  9  6  6  11  11  9  12 
Uzbekistan  29  29  25  27  27  12  7  10  14  12  13 
 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report Update, May 2009. 
Notes: 2008 = preliminary actual figures from official government sources. 
 
   
  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
Kazakhstan  79  1,381  1,662  1,892  176  39  17  8  7 
Kyrgyz Rep  85  855  772  229  41  31  26  36  12 
Tajikistan  112  1,157  2,195  350  609  418  88  28  43 
Turkmenistan  103  493  3,102  1,748  1,005  992  84  24  17 
Uzbekistan  82  645  534  1,568  305  54  59  29  18   25 
Table 3: EBRD Transition Indicators, 1999 and 2008 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report Update May 2009 at http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm - accessed 20 July 2009. 
Note: Indicators are measured on a scale from 1 (no reform) to 4, with pluses and minuses, e.g. 3+ and 3- are represented by 3.33 and 2,67,  
 
Table 4: Openness and Major Exports 
  Exports/GDP  Major exports 
  2006  2007   
Kazakhstan  51  49  Oil, minerals, iron and steel, grain 
Kyrgyz Rep  42  45  Gold, cotton 
Tajikistan  23  21  Aluminium, cotton 
Turkmenistan  72  63  Gas, cotton 
Uzbekistan  38  40  Cotton, gold, gas 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators at www.worldbank.org (accessed 27 April 2009). 
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Kazakhstan  1999  3.00  4.00  2.00  4.00  3.33  2.00  2.33  2.00  2.00 
2008  3.00  4.00  2.00  4.00  3.67  2.00  3.00  2.67  2.67 
Kyrgyz Republic 1999  3.00  4.00  2.00  4.33  4.33  2.00  2.00  2.00  1.33 
2008  3.67  4.00  2.00  4.33  4.33  2.00  2.33  2.00  1.67 
Tajikistan  1999  2.33  3.00  1.67  3.67  2.67  2.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
2008  2.33  4.00  1.67  3.67  3.33  1.67  2.33  1.00  1.33 
Turkmenistan 1999  1.67  2.00  1.67  2.67  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
2008  1.00  2.33  1.00  2.67  2.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Uzbekistan 1999  2.67  3.00  2.00  2.67  1.00  2.00  1.67  2.00  1.33 
2008  2.67  3.33  1.67  2.67  2.00  1.67  1.67  2.00  1.67   26 
Table 5: Production and Exports of Natural Gas, Turkmenistan 1990-2007 (in billion cubic meters) 
 
  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995 
Production  81.9  78.6  56.1  60.9  33.3  30.1 
Exports    74.9  46.9  55.7  24.7  22.0 
  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Production  32.8  16.1  12.4  21.3  43.8  47.9 
Exports  24.0  40.0  2.0  10.0  35.7  38.6 
  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
Production  49.9  55.1  54.4  58.8  62.2  67.4 
Exports  39.4  43.4         
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Figure 2: Oil Prices 1987 - 2009, US dollars per barrel 
 
 
  Source: US Energy Information Administration at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm (accessed 28 July 2009) 